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The reductionist program arose out of the logical positiv
ist era, when philosophers of science judged all other sciences
against the natural sciences, which were believed to be ideal
models of what science should be. Taking this idea one step
further, reductionists held that all other sciences were, at
least theoretically, unnecessary. The basic premise of reduc
tionism is that all the laws of science can be explained, and
thus rendered superfluous, by physics (Garfinkel 443). Un
derlying this assertion (often implicitly) is a belief in the
symmetry of explanation and prediction; thus, standard
reductionism believes that all the laws of science can be
derived from the laws of physics.
The reductionist thesis no longer stands as pure and
unassailed as it did during the heyday of the logical positiv
ists. Many authors have uncovered fatal flaws in the reduc
tionists' views. Some philosophers take their arguments a
stepfurther than merely destroying the idea of the unity of
laws, though: they attempt to cast doubt upon the unity of
science itself, asserting that the specialized scientific disci
plines are necessarily autonomous from one another. This
view is, I believe, too harsh. I intend to argue that while the
sciences may not be unified by law, there is every reason to
believe that they are unified by explanation.
Explanatory Pervasion
Due largely to the notion of what constitutes a law,
reductionism can be shown to be untenable. 1 But what of a
reduction of sorts in the opposite direction? What if, instead
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of predicting a particular event solely from the laws of physics,
I wish merely to explain it? Do such explanations exist?

At least two authors do not think so. Alan Garfinkel and
David Owens argue against what David Owens defines as

explanatory pervasion:
If the occurrence of an Sl-event explains the occur
rence of an 5 2-event then there are physical predicates
Pl and P 2 such that (a) the occurrence of a P1-event is
sufficient for the occurrence of an 51-event, (b) the
occurrence of a P2-event is sufficient for the occur
rence of an 52-event, and (c) PI-events causally ex
plain P2-events. (Owens 65)

This is not identical to reductionism: for explanatory perva
sion to be true, P1 and P 2 need not be related by law. All that
is required is that we can explain the higher-level events in
virtue of the physical mechanisms that connect them.
Garfinkel posits that this is not possible. He illustrates his
argument with the use of an example from ecology: a system
of fluctuating populations of foxes and rabbits. Given that
X(t) denotes the number of foxes at time t and Y( t) denotes the
number of rabbits at time t, we can
describe the behavior of such a system with a pair of differ
ential equations2:

'ff = aXY - bX,

dY

dt =pY -qXY

Using these equations we can put forth some basic expla
nations for phenomena in the system. For example, if the fox
population is high, the rabbit popUlation will most likely be
decreasing. Thus, if a particularrabbit gets caught and eaten,
we can say that [t]he cause of the death of the rabbit was that
the fox population was high" (Garfinkel 446). According to
Garfinkel, this is the macroexpla11.ation of the rabbit's death, for
it appeals to high-level scientific laws. We can attempt a
microexplanation, of the event as well; Garfinkel suggests
If
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L/[r]abbit rwas eaten because he passed through the capture
space of fox f' (Garfinkel 447).
He goes on to argue that these explanations are not
equivalent, because their objects are not the same: the macro
object is the death of the rabbit, whereas the micro-object is
the deathofthe rabbit at the hands offoxf, atplacep, at time
t f etc. Thus, this micro explanation is inadequate in that it is
hyperspecuic - it fails to account for small perturbations in
the initial conditions. One can suppose that had the rabbit
escaped death at the hands of foxf, he probably would have
suffered the fate at the hands of some other fox, assuming the
fox population remained high (Garfinkel 447). But our
microexplanation does not tell us this. Neither, then, does it
tell us how the rabbit might have avoided being caught, and,
as Garfinkel points out, an explanation is inadequate if it does
not lend itself to use for prediction and prevention (Garfinkel
448).
From these assertions, Garfinkel sets forth an alternate
conception of explanation. He associates with each event a
sort of phase space of initial conditions, where, small changes
in the initial conditions do not result in major changes in the
qualitative results except at certain critical points.
The crucial thing we want to know is how this set of
critical points is embedded in the substratum space,
for that will tell us what is really relevant and what is
not. Therefore, what is necessary for a true explana
tion is an account of how the underlying space is
partitioned into basins of irrelevant differences, sepa
rated by ridge lines of critical points. (Garfinkel 452)
Is this impression of explanation really all that different
from the standard account? To answer this question, we need
look only so far as the boundary lines in Garfinkel's explana
tion space. Now, there are two ways of interpreting these
boundary lines: 1) we can explain, in lower terms, why these
boundary lines determine the changes in the system, or 2)
these critical points are an inexplicable property of the sys
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tem itself. If the first interpretation is true, though, we really
don't have a new definition of explanation at all: Garfinkel's
idea collapses into a more standard conception of explana
tion, in which higher-level laws can be explained, if not
derived, using more basic laws. So Garfinkel's use of his
phase-space model of explanation to support the disunity of
science hinges upon whether these critical points are unac
countable features of high-level systems. I assert that this is
not so, for reasons which I shall now explore.
The untenable nature of Garfinkel's arguments becomes
clearer when we consider an idea which led him to the phase
space model of explanation: redundant causality. Garfinkel
feels that in systems such as the fox-rabbit ecology, citing a
particular physical mechanism of the resulting event (e.g.,
citing how the rabbit died) is irrelevant because
[s]ystems which exhibit redundant causality ...
have, for every consequent Q, a bundle of
antecedents (P) such that:
1. If anyone of the Pi is true, so will be Q.
2. If one Pi should not be the case, some other
will. (Garfinkel 448)
Now, I don'ttake issue with (1) - it is just a reformulation
of what David Owens calls the multiple realization point, the
idea that each non-physical state can have associated with it
many subvenient phYSical states. I must, however, disagree
with (2). This aspect states that Q is in some way inevitable
- no matter what happens, the universe will contrive to
assure that some physical mechanism sufficient for Q will
take place. To me, this is excessively speculative; it ascribes
to the universe more order (indeed, almost an intelligence)
than it could reasonably have. Furthermore, it flies in the face
oHact. !tis easily conceivable (though perhaps unlikely) that
our rabbit could have escaped all of the foxes and gone on to
live a long and happy life; his fate was never a foregone
concl usion.
This whole issue can be resolved if one realizes that
Garfinkel's redundant causality is nothing more than a thinly
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veiled theory of probabilistic laws. Based on the high fox
population, the rabbit's death was highly probable, but not
guaranteed. Hence, we could say'at any given time t, the
probability that the rabbit will be caught by a fox is high.'
This probabilistic formulation captures all of the important
features of Garfinkel's redundant causality: (1) is assured
because we know that every time t will have associated with
it a certain physical setup, and among those setups will be
many that are sufficient (but not necessary) for the death of
the rabbit; (2) is covered, and improved, by the fact that it will
be highly improbable, but still possible, that the rabbit should
survive for a long period of time.
Now that we recognize redundant causality as a probabi
listic system, we can attempt anappropriate micro explanation
ofthefox-rabbitecology. To begin, we calculate theprobabil
ity of an individual rabbit r's being caught and eaten in a
given period of time t (denoted by P(rEt)). The differential
equations tell us that in a given unit of time, the number of
rabbits that are eaten is -qXY. The probability of a single
rabbit's being eaten is that number divided by the total
number of rabbits at that time, that is:
qXY
== qX
P(rEt) = y
From this, we see that the probability of an individual rabbit's
being eaten depends only on the number of foxes in the
system!
We can explain this by taking the original
luicroexplanation (that the rabbit was eaten because he en
tered the fox's capture space) as a starting point and asking
why this mechanism was likely to occur, i.e., asking why it
was nomologically expectable that the rabbit should enter a
fox's capture space. It is reasonable to suppose that the size
of an individual fox's capture space (relative to rabbits) is a
function of both the rabbit's and the fox's attributes (their
individual speeds, reaction times, senses of smell, etc.). So we
let S(AR' AF) denote the size of this capture space, where AR
and AF are the relevant attributes of rabbits and foxes. Then
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the total area covered by the capture spaces of all the faxes at
any time t is less than or equal to X S(AR' A F) ("less than or
equal to" because of the possibility of separate faxes having
overlapping capture spaces). Assurrring that the foxes and
rabbits are confined to a region with area R, we can say that
the probability that a rabbit will be in the capture space of a
fox, and hence the probability of his being eaten, is given by
P(rEt) s; X·S (AR' AJ

R
which is, as we predicted, a function of the number of foxes
in the system.
And so we have a formula, stated in terms of probabili
ties, spatio-temporal coordinates, and the biological attributes
of foxes and rabbits, that is a potential explanation of the
behavior at the sociological level. The adequacy of this
explanation can be tested by applying the conditions stated
earlier by Garfinkel - namely, that an adequate explanation
must lend itself to prediction and prevention. Clearly, with
this model I am able to predict how likely it is for anyone
rabbit to die, and from there to derive the overall results at the
sociological level. This model also shows me what I must do
if I wish to prevent the death of rabbits (or at least slow down
the population decline). I can do one of three things: decrease
the number of foxes; decrease the size of the foxes' capture
spaces by improving my rabbits or somehow handicapping
my foxes; or increase the region inwhich the foxes and rabbits
are confined. Of these three, only one is demonstrated in the
original differential equations - the other two are "hidden" in
the constant q. It appears that I have a successful
micro explanation that actually has more descriptive content
than the macro-explanation!
So we see that Garfinkel's arguments are insufficient to
show the absence of explanatory links between the higher
level scientific laws and physics. The case is far from closed,
however. The systems considered so far by Garfinkel and
myself are a good deal less complicated than many systems
which arise in the higher-level sciences. Whereas the ex
amples so far have been ones in which the physical realiza
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tions of the higher-level events have been largely homoge
neous, there are many cases in which the physical mecha
nisms are quite different from one another. In these cases,
one would need to formulate a separate exp lanation for each
type of mechanism.
David Owens makes this point when he considers (in a
more direct fashion than Garfinkel) the thesis of explanatory
pervasion in light of an economic example: a monetary
exchange. Owens looks at Fisher's Law, which states that if
there is an increase in the money supply in an economic
system, then there will be an increase in prices (Owens 62).
Now, increases in the money supply and increases in prices
can be realized in many ways. The discovery of a new gold
mine, the exploitation of a new industry; the lowering of
interest rates, and so forth are examples of an increase in
money supply. Similarly, raises in prices can be reflected in
the real estate market, the agricultural industry, the enter
tainment industry, and every other market in the economic
system. Thus, the PI and Pz in the explanatory pervasion
thesis shall have to be broadened to allow us to apply them
to heterogeneous sets of physical mechanisms. The multiple
physical realizations of these economic predicates shows us
that a necessary condition for the truth of explanatory perva
sion is agglomerativity: ,/ AgglOlnerativity of Causal Explana
tion: If A causally explains Band C causally explains D, then
A&C causally explain B&D" (Neander et al. 460). Further
more, since there will be no direct explanatory linkage be
tween the physical realizations of an increase in the money
supply and an increase in prices, we will have to instantiate
a chain of explanations to connect the two. On the basis of this
argument, one can conclude that an additional necessary
condition for explanatory pervasion is transitivity: "Transi
tivity of Causal Explanation: If A causally explains Band B
ca usally explains C, then A causally explains C" (Neander et
al. 460). Owens proceeds to attempt to show that both
agglomerativity and transitivity do not always apply to
explanation, casting doubt upon the thesis of explanatory
pervasion.
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First, we examine agglomerativity. To attack this thesis,
Owens gives the following Aristotelian example: A man
eats spicy food, and gets thirsty, and so goes out to the well,
where he meets some ruffians who happen to be passing and
who kill him. They did not come for the purpose of finding
him, nor did they lure him there" (Owens 72). Herewehave
a consequent (the man's murder) which is the result of joining
two component physical processes (the arrival of the ruffians
at the well at time t, and the arrival of the man at the well at
time t) each of which have causal explanations: the man's
eating spicy food, and the ruffians wishing to rest at the well.
However, it cannot be said that the joining of these explana
tions causally explains the joint arrival of the man and the
ruffians at the well. This joint arrival has no proper explana
tion; it is a coincidence.
Owens claims that the reason that agglomerativity fails in
this case is that the individual explanations have no cornman
element, just as the explanation of how lowering interest
rates causes inflation has no (or very few) elements in com
mon with an explanation of how the discovery of a new gold
mine accomplishes the same effect (Owens 72). He contrasts
these examples with a situation in which agglomerativity
does hold because of such a common element: ~hejointarrival
of all of the members of an orchestra at an orchestra hall for
a rehearsal can be explained by the fact that each member
heard the conductor announce the time of the rehearsal
(Owens 72).
Karen Neander and Peter Menzies agree with Owens that
the agglomerativity of causal explanations does not always
hold, but they disagree with his arguments to that effect. To
illustrate their point, they redescribe the Aristotelian ex
ample with different constituent explanations:
II

The victim left home at 6 a.m., walked a distance D at
an average velocity of V, and consequently arrived at
the well at noon. The ruffians decamped at 9 a.m.,
walked a distance of D /2 at an average velocity of V,
and also arrived at the well at noon. (Neander et al.
461)
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On the basis of these explanations, the simultaneous arrival
of the man and the ruffians ceases to be coincidental; it is
predictable from our explanations. But these explanations
share no common element, for surely the man's motion is
independent of any causal factors that brought about the
ruffians l motion. Hence, Owens's arguments are deficient.
As an alternative reason to reject agglomerativity, the
authors develop the idea that explanations are often invoked
relative to a contrast class3 :

If we schematize the simplest kind of event as an
object al s having property F at time tl then a request
for a causal explanation of this event may be calling
for different things: it may be calling for an explana
tion of why the object a, rather than some other object,
has F at t; or it may be calling for an explanation of
why a has property FI rather than some other prop
ertyl at t; or it may be requesting an explanation for
why a has F at time t, rather than at some other time.
(Neander et a1. 462)
Relative to this idea, we can illuminate the differences be
tween these two descriptions of the Aristotelian example.
The most important factor of the event that we are consider
ing is that the ruffians and the man arrived at the well at the
same time. So we seek an explanation which will tell us why
they all arrived at the well at that particular time, rather than
some other time. In Owensls explanation, the component
explanations tell us nothing about why the ruffians and the
man arrived at tha t specific time; they merely tell us why they
went to the welll as opposed to going somewhere else.
Neander and Menzies's explanations, on the other handl give
a precise explanation of the times of arrival, and joining them
does explain the two partiesl simultaneous arrival. Accord
inglYI the authors conclude l as far as we can see,
agglomerativity holds provided that the contrast class of the
compound explanation matches the contrast classes of the
individual explanationsll (Neander et a1. 463).
/I
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On this account, we can see that the explanations of the
individual instantiations of Fisher's Law still do not agglom
erate: just as citing the specific mechanism for the rabbit's
death did not explain why he was caught, citing the mecha
nisms through which the rise in prices is achieved is insuffi
cientto show why this inflation took place. We are not asking
why the prices rose at that time, in that place, etc., but rather
why they rose at all. If we could formulate some explanation
that accounted for the reasons behind the inflation, as I did
with the foxes and rabbits, I see no reason to believe that
agglomerativity would not hold for those explanations.
To challenge the idea of the transitivity of causal explana
tions, Owens looks at a well-known nursery rhyme:
For want of a nail the shoe was lost,
For want of a shoe the horse was lost,
For want of a horse, the rider was lost,
For want of a rider the battle was lost,
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost,
And all for want of a horseshoe nail. (Owens

75)
Owens casts doubt upon the validity of the inference in the
last line. Neander and Menzies again agree with Owens that
the transitivity of explanation does not always hold, and
again they make strong claims against the efficacy of Owens's
arguments. Since the details of Owens's position are neither
essential nor illuminative of the issue at hand, I will consider
only the stance of Neander and Menzies on the issue.
The authors invoke another facet of explanation to sup
port their assertion: explanatory relevance. They note that
"in asking for the causal explanation of some event ... one is
asking for an explanatorily relevant causal condition"
(Neander et a1. 464). Thus, the question arises: Are we
justified in saying that PI-events of the type described in the
thesis of explanatory pervasion are explanatorily relevant to
P2-events?
Neander and Menzies contend, correctly, in my opinion,
that the answer is no. In most cases, the explanatory chain

II
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will be too long for this to be true: transitivity will fail in
those cases in which the probability of the explanandum
event falls below [aJ required threshold when we trace its
causal ancestry far enough back" (Neander et al. 465). The
nursery rhyme is one such case. The loss of a battle could
reasonably bring about the loss of a kingdom; and one could
suppose that the loss of a particular rider would be sufficient
for the loss of the kingdom as welt if that rider were the king
or some other vitally important political figure. But tha t is as
far as we may go, say Neander and Menzies, for the loss of a
horse does not make the loss of the kingdom sufficiently
probable for us to say that it is explanatorily relevant.
Is this true? Surely, one would think that if in reality the
battle was lost for lack of one rider; and that rider was lost
only bcause his horse collapsed, and that this in tum hap
pened only because of a loose shoe, then the missing nail
would indeed be necessary in an explanation of the event. To
resolve this conflict, one must distinguish between explana
tory relevance and causal relevance. The missing nail is
causally relevant to the loss of the kingdom in the same way
that "rabbit rentered into the capture space of foxfat time til
is causally relevant to the death of the rabbit. But it is not
explanatorily relevant, for the same reason that the rabbit's
movements were not explanatorily relevant to its death: an
explanation based on the missing nail is not useful for predic
tion and prevention. Had a blacksmith taken more time to
ensure that the horse's shoe was firmly affixed, would that
have prevented the loss of the kingdom? Common sense tells
us no: if the kingdom were so fragile that the death of one
rider would determine its fate, we would guess that some
other minor factor (a rusty sword, for example) would have
caused its downfalL There are other, more important, factors
in the kingdom's history (its military strength, recent politi
cal happenings, economic stability, etc.) that acted to bring
about this fragility, and a true, useful, explanation would cite
these factors.
It is interesting to note that this explication of the transi
tivity of explanation is very closely related to the vindication
11
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of agglomerativity. Again, we are dealing with contrst
classes. The missing nail answers the question, "Why did the
kingdom fall at this time, in this way, in thise as opposed to
falling tomorrow, or to a different country, etc.?" An expla
nation of the kingdom's collapse would more likely be seek
ing hte answer to the question "Why did the kingdom fall at
all, as opposed to continuing on for fity prosperous years?"
Thus, a particular physical realization of the kingdom's
downfall is not explanatorily relevant.
Now that we see that explanatory trnasitivity is ot true in
all cases, we are forced to reject the original concept of
explanatory pervasion inasmuch as it is too strong. All is not
lost, though, for we may still hold on to agglomerativity as
long as we pay adequate attention to the contrast classes of
high-level explanations. Thus, we can formulate a weaker
version of thethesis. Neander and Menzies call it explanatory

pervasion:
If the occurrence of an 51-event explains the occur
rence of an 52-event then there are physical events PI
and P2 such that (a) the ocurrence of the Pt-event is
sufficient for the occurrence of the 51-event; (b) the
occurrence fo the P2-event is sufficient for the occur
rence of the S2eventi and (c) there is aseries ofexplana
tions linking the Pl-event with the P2event. (Neander
et al. 466)
Conclusion

Now we see that those authors who would reject a thesis
of explanatory pervasion are being overly critical of the
positivists'views. Indeed, a belief in the disunity of science
and the autonomy of the spedal sciences goes against both
commonsense and common practice in the scientific commu
nity. This does not mean that traditional formulations of
explanatory pervasion emerge from this debate unscathed.
On the contrary, as I have shown above, in light of the failure
of the transitivity of explanation it is necessary to reformulate
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the thesis in the manner of Neander and Menzies. This new
conception of explanatory unification, as opposed to theory
unification, provides a promising common ground for phi
losophers and scientists alike to share information across
disciplines.
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NOTES

1. Jerry Fodor, in "Special Sciences", does an especially
good job of arguing against reductionism on appeals to ideas
of lawlikeness.
2. In these equations, the product XY represents the
number of encounters between foxes and rabbits; a, b PI and
q are constants whose values are determined by fitting the
observed datain an actual system. These equations are called
the Lotka-Volterra equations, and readers who wish to ex
plore their derivation inmore detail are referred to Garfinkel's
sources: Braun, Differential Equations and Their Applications
(New York: Springer-~erlag, 1975) and E.c. Pielou, An Intro
duction to Mathematical Ecology (New York: Wiley-Interscience,
1977).
3. This idea was, I think, implicit in Garfinkel's argu
ments. I believe his reasoning for why microexplanations
often seem to miss their mark lines up perfectly with this idea.
l

